The Security Council role in keeping peace in Africa
Libya as a case study 2011 - 2017

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Abstract
This research is about the role of the Security Council in keeping peace and security in Africa, shedding the light on the Libyan crisis as a case study considering it one of the highest intensity spots in Africa.
A number of researches mythologies have been used; where the historical method was used in order to track the circumstances that led to establish the United Nations as a universal organization and its evolution, besides the begging of the Libyan crisis till the recent time.
The descriptive method also has been used by the researcher in order to address the most important factors of the Libyan crisis, and the international interventions consequences of the Security Council and the international power states due this regard.
The analytic method in order to find out the most important results of the mentioned interventions, in addition to the case study method.
The researcher has reached to a number of findings have been approved in its entirety assumptions can be summarized as follows:
1- Article 36 of the Charter provides that, at any stage of a dispute of the kind described in Article 33, the Security Council can recommend to the parties appropriate procedures or methods of settlement of their dispute, which may include mediation.
2- There are two main impacts that can be discerned due the international intervention in Libya. First, the debates on Libya led to an explosion of discussions on R2P and increased international engagement with the emerging norm. Second, the controversies led to a shift in the international normative debates on protection by creating a coalition between those human security advocates who opposed stretching the mandate of Resolution 1973, and those countries with non-aligned or postcolonial perspectives that opposed regime change out of principle. This new coalition facilitated the start of an increased discussion about Security Council accountability and the criteria for humanitarian interventions.

According to the previous findings the researcher put a number of recommendations can be summarized as follows:
1- Many reforms must be executed at the Security Council including the voting system and its membership.
2- The organization of the Islamic o-operation must be involve in many regional conflicts including the Syrian & the Libyan that its role is supposed to most more of these conflicts as a great organization its membership includes a wide spots of the Islamic states in many parts of the world.
Preface:

Almost a Decade of Civil War in Libya Continues to Impact Civilians

In Feb. 2011, civilians in Libya, inspired by the Arab spring, took part in protests against their government. Muammar Gadhafi has held complete control over power and wealth in Libya ever since overthrowing King Idris in 1969. Civil war in Libya out in early 2011 as rebels rose up in response to a police crackdown on protesters.

In 2011, during the civil war in Libya, it is estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 people were killed. Those killed included civilians, government forces and rebels.

On Feb. 16, 2011, anti-government protests in Benghazi met violent opposition from police. Protests quickly spread to the capital of Tripoli, and more than 200 people were killed. The conflict escalated from Feb. 16 to Feb. 21, on which day Gadhafi made a speech vowing to die a martyr rather than step down.

The conflict drew international interest for humanitarian and economic reasons. Libya has a significant standing as one of the largest oil-producing countries in the world. It produces two percent of the world’s oil supply.

In March 2011, French, British and American forces took action in Libya. More than 110 missiles fired from American and British ships hit about 20 Libyan air and missile defense targets. A week later, NATO agreed to take command of the mission and enforced a no-fly zone over Libya. In October, Gadhafi was found and killed by rebel forces.

Seven years later, Libyans are still feeling the aftershocks of the conflict. According to Amnesty International’s most recent report on Libya, there are now three rival governments competing for power in the country. The U.N. backs the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj based in the capital of Tripoli. The GNA has been unable to enforce authority over the area. The Libyan National Army (LNA), led by General Khalifa Haftar, refuses to recognize the GNA and continues to fight for control of Libya. The rest of the country is ruled by local militias and Islamist groups, including ones linked to ISIS.

The direct humanitarian impact of the civil war in Libya is that hundreds of thousands of people across the country are now living in unsafe conditions with little access to healthcare, food, safe drinking water, shelter and education. An estimated 100,000 people are in need of international protection and 226,000 internally displaced people.
A disturbing development of a slave trade has also become apparent in Libya. According to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Libyans and migrants are being detained and sold in open slave markets. Due to the split governments, no authority is able to stop the human rights abuses.

Civilians in Libya continue to suffer as a result of the conflict. The desire for reform was well-intentioned, but the transfer of power following the death of Gadhafi did not go as planned. The resulting fracture of the country has thrown Libya into turmoil without any indication of ending.

– Sam Bramlett (1)

The research`s importance:

This study handles with a high intensity issue about the situation in Libya where it having a serious internal changes must be solved, as there were also many interventions by the international power states such as (The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, and China) in addition to the United Nation`s Security Council; what caused the resent failure of the Libyan State, where it rise up the research`s importance in mentioning the Security Council failure in the resolution process in Libya.

The research`s objectives:

1- Describe the Arab Spring influences to the Libyan State.
2- Determine the Security Council and International power states role at the Libyan crises, the failure of these interventions.

The research`s problem:

The problem of this research is clearly appear at the security council decisions in Libya did not lead to any kind of effective solutions and the international interventions has led to high the escalation trigger in Libya what it rise the following questions?
1- Does the Security Council play any important role in conflicts resolutions?
2- What is the role of the international interventions at the Libyan crisis, and how did it affected on the situation?

1) Sam Bramlett Almost a Decade of Civil War in Libya Continues to Impact Civilians, https://borgenproject.org/decade-civil-war-in-libya/, April 2018
3- What was the main role of the Security Council in the Libyan conflict?
4- Were there any roles to the regional organizations in the Libyan crisis, especially by The Arab league Organization?

The research`s hypotheses:

1- The United Nation charter has determined clearly the Security Council role in conflicts resolution.
2- The international interventions in Libya and many other States Such as Syria and Iraq have led to a huge mess in these States as many describe it as a failed States.
3- The Security Council didn`t has clear role in many conflicts including the Libyan crisis.
4- There were a little role to the Arab league Organization in the Libyan conflict.

The research`s mythologies:

A number of researches mythologies have been used; where the historical method was used in order to track the circumstances that led to establish the United Nations as a universal organization and its evolution, besides the begging of the Libyan crisis till the recent time.

The descriptive method also has been used by the researcher in order to address the most important factors of the Libyan crisis, and the international interventions consequences of the Security Council and the international power states due this regard.

The analytic method in order to find out the most important results of the mentioned interventions, in addition to the case study method.

The data collection tools:

The researcher has used a number of sources as follows:
1- Primary sources such as; Qur’an, reports, and book sources.
2- Secondary sources such as; books, magazines, and internet sites.

The research`s boundaries:

Place: Libya
Time: 2011 – 2017
Previous studies:

1) Mubarak Abu baker Shikho, the role of the security council in disputing the African continent conflicts – Rwanda as a case study 1993/2010, a research presented to a word the master degree in the field of the international relations, council of the political sciences and diplomatic studies, 2017:

   The research aimed to define the most important articles of the Security Council protocol, and to stand on the Council`s role and its efficiency in disputing conflicts in the African continent, then clarify the Council`s role in disputing the conflict in Rwanda.

   A number of research mythologies have been used, where the historical method was used to track the evolution of many concepts due this regard, as the legal method also have been used to address the Security Council decisions due the crisis in Rwanda, and the case study method.

   From the most important findings the researcher has mentioned the failure of the Security Council in its position comparing with it abilities which has not been used with the exception of the ICC/ International Criminal Court establishing decision due the Rwandan crisis.

   The researcher has recommended strengthening the co-operation between the Security Council and the other specialized agencies due this Crisis

2) Kamal Sa`adi Mustafa, the Security Council and its role in conflicts disputing, collage of law and politics, Salah Adden University, a master research, Arbile, Iraq, 2013:

   The special importance of this research that it handles with the role of the Security Council in disputing conflicts in general in spotting the light on the internal ones, and that the international dimensions at the time of increasing the international interventions at this era what gives the motivation to more interventions covered with protecting human rights, the ethnic and religious minorities rights.

   One of the most important findings is that defining the conflicts by the Security Council is very important issue in order to deal with it, and the United Nation and specially its Security Council at the involvement process covers it with the roles of the international law.

3) Abd Almun`em Mansour, the role of the African security council in disputing the armed conflicts – Darfur as a case study, a master research, Zagazig University, Cairo, Egypt.
The aim of this research is to spot the light on the African Security Council and identifying the strength and the weakness spots that must be treated.

The research`s structure:

This research has been divided into an introduction chapter, besides another two chapters each one of them contain three section, in addition to the conclusion which contain the research`s summary and a list of the most important findings and recommendation.

Section One: The role of the Security Council in conflicts resolution

THE SECURITY COUNCIL & MEDIATION

In accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council, as the organ of the United Nations invested with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties a dispute of the nature described in Article 33 to settle it by the means listed in that Article.

Article 36 of the Charter provides that, at any stage of a dispute of the kind described in Article 33, the Security Council can recommend to the parties appropriate procedures or methods of settlement of their dispute, which may include mediation.

In accordance with Articles 37 and 38 of the Charter, the Security Council also has the power to recommend terms of settlement to the parties, if they request this or if the Council considers that the continuance of their dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

In accordance with Article 29 of the Charter, the Security Council may establish subsidiary organs as a means to promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It has used this power to establish subsidiary organs to carry out mediation.
Regional and sub-regional organizations play an important role in the peaceful settlement of disputes. In accordance with, Article 52 of the Charter, the Security Council should encourage the peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional organizations and may refer such disputes to them.

The Security Council focused on the topic of mediation and the settlement of disputes in its high-level debate in 2008 and in an open debate in 2009. In its Presidential Statement of 23 September 2008 (S/PRST/2008/36), the Security Council underlined 'the importance of mediation as a means of pacific settlement of disputes, and encourages the further use of this mechanism in the settlement of disputes'.
Section One: Libya; geopolitics

The political History of Libya:

Libya: is a country in the Maghreb region of North Africa, bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Egypt to the east, Sudan to the southeast, Chad and Niger to the south and Algeria and Tunisia to the west. The country is made of three historical regions, Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica. With an area of almost 1.8 million square kilometers (700,000 sq. mi), Libya is the fourth largest country in Africa, and is the 16th largest country in the world. Libya had the 10th-largest proven oil reserves of any country in the world.

The largest city and capital, Tripoli, is located in western Libya and contains over one million of Libya's six million people. The other large city is Benghazi, which is located in eastern Libya.

Libya has been inhabited by Berbers since the late Bronze Age, the Phoenicians established trading posts in western Libya, and ancient Greek colonists established city-states in eastern Libya.

Libya was variously ruled by Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians and Greeks before becoming a part of the Roman Empire. Libya was an early center of Christianity. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the area of Libya was mostly occupied by the Vandals until the 7th century, when invasions brought Islam and Arab colonization. In the 16th century, the Spanish Empire and the Knights of St John occupied Tripoli, until Ottoman rule began in 1551. Libya was involved in the Barbary Wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. Ottoman rule continued until the Italian occupation of Libya resulted in the temporary Italian Libya colony from 1911 to 1943. During the Second World War Libya was an important area of warfare in the North African Campaign. The Italian population then went into decline. (2)

Libya became independent as a kingdom in 1951. A military coup in 1969 overthrew King Idris I. The coup leader Muammar Gaddafi ruled the country from the Libyan Cultural Revolution in 1973 until he was overthrown and killed in the Libyan Civil War of 2011. Since then, Libya has been unstable.

In the second Libyan Civil War ongoing since 2014, two authorities initially claimed to govern Libya: the Council of Deputies in Tobruk, and the 2014 General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli, which considered itself the continuation of the General National Congress, elected in 2012.

After UN-led peace talks between the Tobruk and Tripoli governments, an unified interim UN-backed Government of National Accord was established in 2015, and the GNC disbanded to support it.

Parts of Libya remain outside of either government's control, with various Islamist, rebel, and tribal militias administering some areas. As of July 2017 talks are still ongoing between the GNA and the Tobruk based authorities to end the strife and unify the divided establishments of the state including the Libyan Armed Forces and the Central Bank of Libya.

**Geography**

Libya extends over 1,759,540 square kilometers (679,362 sq. mi), making it the 17th largest nation in the world by size. Libya is bound to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, the west by Tunisia and Algeria, the southwest by Niger, the south by Chad, Sudan on the southeast, and to the east by Egypt. Libya lies between latitudes 19° and 34°N, and longitudes 9° and 26°E. At 1,770 kilometers (1,100 mi), Libya's coastline is the longest of any African country bordering the Mediterranean.

The portion of the Mediterranean Sea north of Libya is often called the Libyan Sea. The climate is mostly extremely dry and desert like in nature. However, the northern regions enjoy a milder Mediterranean climate. Natural hazards come in the form of hot, dry, dust laden sirocco (known in Libya as the gibli). This is a southern wind blowing from one to four days in spring and autumn. There are also dust storms and sandstorms. Oases can also be found scattered throughout Libya, the most important of which are Ghadames and Kufra, Libya is one of the sunniest and driest countries in the world due to prevailing presence of desert environment. (3)

**Libyan Desert**

The Libyan Desert, which covers much of Libya, is one of the most arid and sun-baked places on earth.

In places, decades may pass without seeing any rainfall at all and even in the highlands rainfall seldom happens, once every 5–10 years. At Uweinat, as of 2006 the last recorded rainfall was in September 1998.

Likewise, the temperature in the Libyan Desert can be extreme; on 13 September 1922 the town of 'Aziziya, which is located southwest of Tripoli, recorded an air temperature of 58 °C (136.4 °F), and considered to be a world record.

In September 2012, however, the world record figure of 58 °C was overturned by the World Meteorological Organization.

There are a few scattered uninhabited small oases, usually linked to the major depressions, where water can be found by digging to a few feet in depth. In the

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west there is a widely dispersed group of oases in unconnected shallow depressions, the Kufr group, consisting of Tazerbo, Rebianaee and Kufr.[119] Aside from the scarps, the general flatness is only interrupted by a series of plateaus and massifs near the center of the Libyan Desert, around the convergence of the Egyptian-Sudanese-Libyan borders.

Slightly further to the south are the massifs of Arkenu, Uweinat and Kissu. These granite mountains are ancient, having formed long before the sandstones surrounding them. Arkenu and Western Uweinat are ring complexes very similar to those in the Aïr Mountains. Eastern Uweinat (the highest point in the Libyan Desert) is a raised sandstone plateau adjacent to the granite part further west.

The plain to the north of Uweinat is dotted with eroded volcanic features. With the discovery of oil in the 1950s also came the discovery of a massive aquifer underneath much of Libya. The water in this aquifer pre-dates the last ice ages and the Sahara Desert itself. This area also contains the Arkenu structures, which were once thought to be two impact craters.

Demographics

Libya is a large country with a relatively small population, and the population is concentrated very narrowly along the coast. Population density is about 50 persons per km² (130/sq. mi.) in the two northern regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but falls to less than one person per km² (2.6/sq. mi.) elsewhere. Ninety percent of the people live in less than 10% of the area, primarily along the coast. About 88% of the population is urban, mostly concentrated in the three largest cities, Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata.

Libya has a population of about 6.5 million, 27.7% of whom are under the age of 15. And in 1984 the population was 3.6 million, an increase from the 1.54 million reported in 1964. So there are about 140 tribes and clans in Libya. Family life is important for Libyan families, the majority of which live in apartment blocks and other independent housing units, with precise modes of housing depending on their income and wealth. Although the Libyan Arabs traditionally lived nomadic lifestyles in tents, they have now settled in various towns and cities. Because of this, their old ways of life are gradually fading out. An unknown small number of Libyans still live in the desert as their families have done for centuries. Most of the population has occupations in industry and services, and a small percentage is in agriculture.

According to the UNHCR, there were around 8,000 registered refugees, 5,500 unregistered refugees, and 7,000 asylum seekers of various origins in Libya
in January 2013. Additionally, 47,000 Libyan nationals were internally displaced and 46,570 were internally displaced returnees. (4)

Local demographics and ethnic groups

The original inhabitants of Libya belonged predominantly to various Berber ethnic groups; however, the long series of foreign invasions – particularly by Arabs and Turks – have had a profound and lasting influence on Libya's demographics. Today, the majority of Libyans are Arab mainly from Banu Sulaym tribe, beside Turkish and Berber ethnicities. The Turkish minority are often called "Kouloughlis" and are concentrated in and around villages and towns.[193] Additionally, there are some Libyan ethnic minorities, such as the Berber speaking Tuareg and the Tebou.


Immigrant labor as of 2013, the UN estimates that around 12% of Libya's population (upwards of 740,000 people) was made up of foreign migrants.

Prior to the 2011 revolution official and unofficial figures of migrant labor range from 25% to 40% of the population (between 1.5 and 2.4 million people). Historically, Libya has been a host state for millions of low- and high-skilled Egyptian migrants, in particular.

It is difficult to estimate the total number of immigrants in Libya as there are often differences between census figures, official counts and usually more accurate unofficial estimates. In the 2006 census, around 359,540 foreign nationals were resident in Libya out of a population of over 5.5 million (6.35% of the population). Almost half of these were Egyptians, followed by Sudanese and Palestinian immigrants.

During the 2011 revolution, 768,362 immigrants fled Libya as calculated by the IOM, around 13% of the population at the time, although many more stayed on in the country.

If consular records prior to the revolution are used to estimate the immigrant population, as many as 2 million Egyptian migrants were recorded by the Egyptian embassy in Tripoli in 2009, followed by 87,200 Tunisians, and 68,200 Moroccans by their respective embassies. The number of Asian migrants before the revolution was roughly 100,000 (60,000 Bangladeshis, 18,000 Indians, 10,000 Pakistanis, 8000 Filipinos as well as Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Thai and other workers). This would put the immigrant population at almost 40% before the revolution and is a figure more consistent with government estimates in 2004 which put the regular and irregular migrant numbers at 1.35 to 1.8 million (25–33% of the population at the time).

Libya's native population of Arabs and Berbers as well as Arab migrants of various nationalities collectively make up 97% of the population as of 2014. The remaining 3% of residents include mostly Bangladeshis, Greeks, Indians, Italians, Maltese, Turks, and Ukrainians as well as other nationalities.

Section Two: The emergence of the Libyan crisis

The Arab Spring and Libya

On 17 December 2010 a young fruit and vegetable seller named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in a desperate protest against bureaucratic indifference and police corruption in Tunisia. His gruesome death provoked a month of fierce anti-government protests, and on 14 January 2011 President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled into exile. Inspired by the Tunisian experience, mass demonstrations against the politically bankrupt regime of President Hosni Mubarak began soon after in Egypt. The civil revolt, focused around Cairo’s Tahrir Square, succeeded in toppling his thirty-year dictatorship within three weeks. Sensing that a seismic shift in regional politics was now underway, similar protests erupted in Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere. As popular movements for change radiated across the Middle East and North Africa in the opening weeks of 2011, the question was not whether this “Arab Spring” would continue, but which repressive government would fall next.

Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had ruled Libya since seizing power in a military coup in 1969, eyed these developments suspiciously. On 15 February, just four days after Mubarak’s resignation, protests began in Libya. An estimated two hundred people gathered in front of police headquarters in Benghazi demanding the release of a well-known human rights lawyer. A number of people were injured as the demonstration was broken up by the Libyan security forces.

When general protests against the government spread to other towns the following day, the security forces employed lethal force. Fourteen people were killed and Libyan supporters of the Arab Spring, especially those overseas with better access to social media, called for a “Day of Rage.” Despite government

5 ) Simons Adam, Libyan and the responsibility to protect, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series No. 3, October 2012, p. 7 – 8.
6 ) This paper draws upon the earlier work of Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect staff whose policy brief, “R2P After Libya and Côte d’Ivoire: Perceptions and Misconceptions,” is further developed here.
warnings that live ammunition would be used to disperse mobs, large
demonstrations took place in at least four major cities, including Benghazi and
Tripoli, on 17 February.

Human Rights Watch estimated that twenty-four protesters were killed by
the security forces. The demonstrations then rapidly increased in scale and ferocity
until they evolved into a country-wide popular uprising against Qaddafi.

Protesters in Benghazi, Baida, Ajdabiya, Misrata and Zawiya took to the
streets. Some attacked symbols of the regime, set fire to police stations and
damaged other government buildings. Eyewitness accounts reported “dozens”
killed by security forces in Benghazi after 17 February, including fifteen people
shot at the funeral of a protestor who had been killed earlier. While it was
impossible to verify all of the terrifying and sensational reports from inside Libya,
it was credibly claimed by Human Rights Watch and others that by 20 February at
least 173 people had been killed during four days of protests. About this time the
first shaky videos purportedly showing armed men going door-to-door in Benghazi
attacking suspected opponents of the Qaddafi regime were broadcast on the
international news networks. There were also stories of military aircraft flying low
over demonstrations in a menacing display of potential lethal violence. It was
reported that three people had been killed in Tajura, on the outskirts of Tripoli,
when a fighter plane opened fire. Meanwhile, armed Qaddafi loyalists reportedly
patrolled Tripoli in pick-up trucks, arresting or shooting at anyone suspected of
public dissent.

As the uprising spread, the Libyan police were forced out of Benghazi and
then from Misrata by 24 February. A number of towns in the east of the country
began to slip from Qaddafi’s control. Some protesters started arming themselves
and defending their neighborhoods from the security forces.

The situation shifted inexorably from demonstration to insurrection as
volunteer militias were formed across the east of the country.

The regime committed more desperate acts of violence and issued
blood-curdling threats. On the night of 20 February Qaddafi’s heir apparent, his
son Saif al-Islam, appeared on Libyan television threatening that “thousands”
would die and “rivers of blood” would flow if the rebellion did not stop. The next
day, two Libyan fighter jets landed in Malta and their pilots alleged that they had
been ordered to bomb Benghazi.

Soon after, Qaddafi, speaking in Tripoli, called upon loyalists to “get out of your
houses” and “attack” all opponents of the regime. Invoking language that was
reminiscent of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, he described protesters as
drug-crazed “rats,” “cockroaches” and “cowards and traitors.” He left no doubt
about his intentions as he promised to “cleanse Libya house by house. Estimates of
the number of civilians killed between 15 and 22 February vary. Residents of
Tajura described numerous bodies littering the streets. The UN Human Rights Council’s International Commission of Inquiry received medical records regarding protesters shot dead in Tripoli, with doctors testifying that more than 200 bodies were brought into their morgues over 20-21 February. The International Criminal Court (ICC) later estimated that 500 to 700 civilians were killed in February prior to the outbreak of civil war. Although some of the emerging stories were exaggerated, by 22 February it was clear that the Qaddafi regime, in its desperation to hold on to power, was willing to use extreme violence to crush the popular uprising. Despite censorship, confusion, rumors and misinformation, the threat of mass atrocities was imminent and real. (8)

Section three: Libya and the responsibility to protect:

The Libyan conflict in 2011 presents an important case study on authorization of the use of force on the normative basis of R2P. For forty-two years, the Libyan government limited opportunities for social advancement to Qaddafi’s family members and supporters or close associates; the undemocratic regime used repressive security services to maintain its power. When Libyans took to the streets in February of 2011, echoing their Tunisian and Egyptian neighbors’ demands for more representation and rights, they were met with “lethal and indiscriminate” violence by Qaddafi’s security forces. (9) International condemnation and calls for restraint failed to halt attacks against increasingly large protests. The UN Security Council, encouraged by P-5 states such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, first imposed sanctions and subsequently authorized the use of force to protect civilians, consistent with the provisions of R2P. These actions raise two key questions: did the situation in Libya warrant action under R2P, and why did such intervention occur?

Did responsibility to protect apply?

The Libyan government did everything it could to maintain power. Even before protests began, the government realized that political unrest in the neighboring countries of Tunisia and Egypt could inspire similar efforts in Libya; it proceeded to take preemptive measures such as reducing food prices in an

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8 } Simons Adam, Libyan and the responsibility to protect, previous source, p. 7 – 8.
9 ) Jack H. Runner The responsibility to protect: a comparative analysis of UN security council actions in Libya and Syria, Ostia Afoaku, School of Public and Environmental Affairs Faculty Mentor, P. 8.
attempt to discourage unrest. These efforts failed, with the first large protest against Qaddafi’s government occurring on February 15. Almost immediately, the government decided to use force to suppress protestors and maintain control. Two days later, a “day of rage” occurred that was met with violence in which at least 20 people were killed.\(^{(10)}\) As public discontent escalated, Libyan authorities loyal to Qaddafi arrested hundreds of civilians, attacked protestors with all manner of weapons, including aircraft, and killed hundreds. The perception of continuous, unrestrained violence on the part of the regime gave momentum to growing calls for Qaddafi to leave and/or some type of international intervention. Qaddafi only compounded international outrage by publicly pledging to “’cleanse Libya, house by house’ until the protestors had surrendered.”\(^{(11)}\)

Continuing violence led to Security Council Resolution 1970, which specifically invoked “’the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population,’ condemned its violence against civilians, demanded that this stop,” and sought to elicit a positive response from Col. Qaddafi and his cronies “by applying targeted sanctions, an arms embargo and the threat of International Criminal Court prosecution for crimes against humanity.” It also included the possibility of modifying international pressure depending on whether Col. Qaddafi’s government complied with the resolution.\(^{(12)}\) Citing R2P in this case was justified because forces loyal to Col. Qaddafi were essentially massacring protestors and Qaddafi was taking no steps to defuse the situation peacefully. Resolution 1970, passed on February 26, 2011, called upon the current Libyan government to take responsibility for protecting its own civilians, an obligation easily agreed upon in the UNSC as the Resolution passed unanimously. Much more controversial was the invocation of Chapter VII and R2P as rationale to authorize the international use of force to protect civilians when the situation became more violent.

In eastern Libya in late February, 2011, protestors seized weapons depots and military bases, while government forces defected or fled; “the situation started to take the form of an armed rebellion.”\(^{(13)}\) The opposition managed to gain control of many towns in eastern Libya, most notably the country’s second largest city, Benghazi, but remained significantly less equipped than government forces. Qaddafi’s forces mobilized their land and air forces and began an offensive in early March, recapturing several towns and advancing to within 140 kilometers of Benghazi by March 15. The government then announced “that the rebellion would be defeated within 48 hours” as its troops advanced toward Benghazi. It quickly

\(^{10}\) “Country Analysis, Libya,” Institute for Security Studies, 2011

\(^{11}\) “Country Analysis, Libya,” Institute for Security Studies, 2011

\(^{12}\) Security Council, 26 February 2011

\(^{13}\) “Country Analysis, Libya,” previous source, 2011
became apparent that Qaddafi was ignoring Resolution 1970 and preparing to assault Benghazi while showing “no mercy...to perceived opponents, armed or otherwise.”33 Given Qaddafi’s actions, his threatening statements, and perceived imminent danger to civilians in Benghazi, the UN Security Council again took action. On March 17, 2011, it passed Resolution 1973 with 10 votes for, 0 against, and 5 abstentions.

In contrast to most previous UN actions, Resolution 1973 authorizing armed intervention in Libya occurred in direct opposition to a still-technically legitimate regime. When Resolution 1973 was adopted, the only countries that formally recognized the Interim National Transitional Council (NTC) as Libya’s government were France and Italy. The UNSC authorized action against a sitting government failing to protect its own people. This legal aspect is highly significant for potential future R2P NATO began a bombing campaign within 48 hours, and effectively halted Qaddafi’s forces’ advance towards Benghazi, “stopping a major catastrophe.”

Given Col. Qaddafi’s unapologetic move to unleash violence against his own people, his government clearly failed to live up to its Responsibility to protect its own population. UNSC Resolution 1970 gave it a chance to step back, defuse the situation, and halt the violence. This opportunity was promptly ignored. Therefore, invoking R2P, this time as grounds for international intervention, was again warranted, though the methods of implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973 were questionable interventions because the implication is that the UNSC can interfere with matters most would consider internal. Citing the Qaddafi government’s failure to protect its own citizens or abide by UNSC Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973 called for an immediate ceasefire, instituted a no-fly zone, and authorized “all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas.” NATO began a bombing campaign within 48 hours, and effectively halted Qaddafi’s forces’ advance towards Benghazi, “stopping a major catastrophe.” Given Col. Qaddafi’s unapologetic move to unleash violence gains this own people, his government clearly failed to live up to its Responsibility to Protect its own population. UNSC Resolution 1970 gave it a chance to step back, defuse the situation, and halt the violence. This opportunity was promptly ignored. Therefore, invoking R2P, this time as grounds for international intervention, was again warranted, though the methods of implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973 were questionable.
MOTIVES FOR INTERVENTION OR NONINTERVENTION

Was there an urgent humanitarian basis for international intervention in Libya? If a humanitarian crisis in the form of ongoing or impending mass atrocities was sufficient to invoke R2P, in the past there would likely have been significantly more international interventions than have occurred. To explain the lack thereof, we must again consider the organization responsible for authorizing said action, the Security Council. The power wielded by the UNSC and its P-5 members in particular determines not only which situations warrant intervention, but when and how the international community will intervene. Interestingly, as stated by Jason Davidson, a state considers intervention when “it believes that the R2P norm requires it, its national interest is threatened by the target, or its prestige is implicated.” With regard to the 2011 Libyan crisis, it is critical to examine the motivating factors and interests of each P-5 member to explain their actions and votes in regard to the Libyan crisis and UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973.

China on Libya

A key interest for China is the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. Therefore, China would initially be reluctant to any measure authorizing the use of force against a sovereign nation. China also had some economic and political ties to Col. Qaddafi’s regime, yet it voted for Resolution 1970 and abstained on Resolution 1973, allowing sanctions and military action to move forward.

Although at face-value the China had a friendly relationship with the Qaddafi regime, China did not have vested interests in protecting the Libyan government. When the Libyan conflict began, China had $18 billion in deals and over 35,000 of its citizens were living in Libya. However, China’s relations with the Libyan government were strained over Qaddafi’s outreach to Taiwan and his sometime opposition to Chinese economic interests in Africa. Libya hosted Taiwan’s president in 2006 over strong protests from Beijing. It also allowed Taiwan to open a trade office in Tripoli in 2008 despite significant Chinese opposition. While Libyan crude exports to China more than doubled from 2008 to 2011; Libya blocked the sale of a small Canadian oil company, Verenex Energy Inc., to the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. The Libyan foreign minister also called the situation “a Chinese invasion of the continent,” comparing their actions to colonialism. These political differences and threats to China’s

14 These citizens were evacuated by March 5, 2011; Xuedong, 2011
economic interests help explain why China did offer stronger support to Qaddafi in his time of trouble; he was an unreliable quasi-ally.

Two other key reasons China endorsed sanctions and did not veto the no-fly zone are China’s concern for its international image and its miscalculation regarding how Resolution 1973 would be enforced. China may have seen a risk in isolation from both important international actors and regional organizations. Resolution 1970 was unanimous and abstaining from supporting Resolution 1973 put China’s vote in the same basket as Russia, India, Germany, and Brazil. Furthermore, the support of expending international political capital for an isolated and erratic semi-ally did not resonate with larger Chinese interests in strengthening political and economic relations with the regions. Indeed, China’s representative to the United Nations explicitly stated that his country did not block the action “in consideration of the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union.”

It was also not clear that passing Resolution 1973 would necessarily lead to a large NATO-led bombing campaign. The first three operative clauses called for a ceasefire, a peaceful solution, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance.

China may have been more comfortable with limited actions enforcing a no-fly zone, stopping Qaddafi’s advance towards Benghazi, and waiting to defend civilians while letting international sanctions and local pressures move both sides toward a ceasefire. The Chinese representative to the UN, Li Baodong, stressed that peaceful solution should still be pursued and stated that his delegation’s questions regarding Resolution 1973 had not been answered.

China began critiquing NATO military overreach almost as soon as the bombing began; this perception would influence its position on Syria.

Both the African Union and the League of Arab States “understandably influenced China given its growing economic and political ties with Africa and the Middle East.” Expending international political capital for an isolated and erratic semi-ally did not resonate with larger Chinese interests in strengthening political and economic relations with the regions. Indeed, China’s representative to the United Nations explicitly stated that his country did not block the action “inconsideration of the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union.” It was also not clear that passing Resolution 1973 would necessarily lead to a large NATO-led bombing campaign. The first three operative clauses called for a ceasefire, a peaceful solution, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance. China may have been more comfortable with limited actions enforcing a no-fly zone,

15 ) Security Council, 17 March 2011
stopping Qaddafi’s advance towards Benghazi, and waiting to defend civilians while letting international sanctions and local pressures move both sides toward a cease fire. The Chinese representative to the UN, Li Baodong, stressed that peaceful solution should still be pursued and stated that his delegation’s questions regarding Resolution 1973 had not been answered.45China began critiquing NATO military over reach almost as soon as the bombing began; this perception would influence its position on Syria.

**Russia on Libya**

Russia was similarly wary of Western-led interventions, particularly in a country with which it enjoyed friendly relations. Russia’s economic and political ties with the Qaddafi regime were warm and growing more cordial before the crisis began. Its vote for UNSC Resolution1970 cost it military contracts and its abstention on UNSC Resolution 1973 paved the way for a NATO campaign that eventually helped overthrow Qaddafi. Like China, Russia allowed these Resolutions to go forward out of larger concerns for its relationship with Middle Eastern and African states and because it was unaware of the consequences implementation would bring.

Russia and Libya enjoyed a relatively close relationship dating back to the Soviet Union. In recent years before the crisis, economic cooperation and arms sales continued. In 2008, Russia wrote off $4.5 billion in Libyan debt in exchange for Russian companies receiving large contracts.16 Then President Vladimir Putin conducted the first official visit of a Russian president to Libya, where he signed “’a large number of agreements’” with Libya, which he called “’a friendly country…with which we can work together to resolve problems.’”17

In 2010, arms contracts with Libya worth $10 billion made up 12% of Russian arms exports. Nevertheless, Qaddafi was just one of many partners, and not one important enough to warrant Russia jeopardizing relations with other states.

Like China, Russia was impacted by the position of the African Union and League of Arab States (LAS), which supported UNSC measures. The Arab League in particular “demanded action from the UNSC.”18 Nevertheless, Russia had significant reservations about Resolution 1973. Russian ambassador to the UN

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16 ) “Russia and Libya: bilateral relations,” 2011
17 ) “Putin’s visit ‘historic and strategic,’” 2008
Vitaly Churkin stated that questions as to how the resolution would be implemented and by whom were unanswered, and an immediate ceasefire was the best way forward.

Russia explicitly “explained its abstention as being an expression of support for the LAS request.” Had Russia realized that implementation of the Resolution would have led to a massive NATO-led bombing campaign and overthrow of Qaddafi; it doubtlessly would have vetoed Resolution 1973.

**United States on Libya**

The United States was motivated by humanitarian concerns, long-running opposition to Col. Gadhafi, and its allies’ determination. First and foremost, the United States has placed higher priority on stopping mass atrocities and on R2P in recent years. Although relations with Qaddafi’s government had been improving since 2003, the two countries were by no means friendly. Finally, the push by American allies and regional organizations gave the United States the confidence to support multilateral intervention.

US policy has steadily shifted towards taking R2P more seriously and establishing it as an international norm. R2P was included in the May 2010 US National Security Strategy. (19)

On August 4, 2011, a Presidential Study Directive declared that “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” and mandated the creation of an Atrocities Prevention Board. Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN at the time of the Libyan conflict, and Samantha Power, then an Obama National Security Council aide, are strong supporters of R2P, including its provisions for intervention to prevent and stop atrocities. The ferocity of Qaddafi’s suppression of dissent quickly gained the attention of these and other policymakers.

The US relationship with Qaddafi has been tumultuous and contentious. After various provocations, including support of terror groups and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, Libya was placed on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism as far back as 1979. The US expelled all Libyan diplomats in 1981 and shot down two Libyan fighter jets that fired on US aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea. Libya also was at least partially responsible for the Berlin disco bombing in 1986, the 1988 Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and the 1989 bombing

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19 ) Williams, Paul and Alex Bellamy, 2012
of a French passenger jet over Niger, collectively resulting in hundreds of deaths, including those of Americans.

Libya was subject to a variety of US and UN sanctions over the years. Relations began to thaw in 1999, when Libya turned over two citizens to be tried in The Hague for the Pan Am bombing. Relations further improved when Libya agreed to compensate victims of its various bombings, accepted responsibility for the Pan Am bombing, and gave up its weapons of mass destruction program in 2003. These steps among others have “seen Libya come back into the international fold;” the United States resumed diplomatic relations and removed Libya from its state sponsors of terror list in 2006. (20) Nevertheless, past skepticism and antagonism between the Americans and Qaddafi meant they were by no means bosom friends. The American government remained sharply skeptical of Qaddafi’s commitment to renouncing terror and WMD, and he showed no move towards improved human rights or democracy.

The regional support from the AU and Arab League already mentioned and the strong desire of France and Britain for intervention helped convince the United States to support Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and participate in the military mission.

**France on Libya**

France was the most enthusiastic country regarding intervention and the first to begin airstrikes. It was also the first country to recognize Libya’s National Transitional Council.61While humanitarian concerns played a role, the French government’s support for intervention was also motivated by the conviction that taking strong action was in its national interest in terms of its security, economy, and prestige.

France condemned violence by Qaddafi’s government early and often, with President Nicolas Sarkozy calling it “brutal and bloody” and “revolting.” Qaddafi, with his repeated support for terrorism, was “the ideal villain.”63Once a state takes initial actions condemning the target government’s human rights violations, it becomes more likely to intervene because it “burns bridges with the target government” and its prestige is implicated. If Qaddafi did prevail, future economic cooperation would be less likely and the prospect of him turning to terrorism again would be very plausible, particularly after Resolution 1970 was passed. Therefore,

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20) “Libya compensates terror victims,” 2008
once France began taking steps against Qaddafi, its economy and security would be better off if Libya formed a new government friendlier to France.

The refugee crisis prompted by Libyan unrest was perceived to pose a direct threat to France. French officials, including President Sarkozy, repeatedly expressed concerned that the “massive flight” of foreigners in Libya and Libyans towards Egypt, Tunisia, and eventually across the Mediterranean.

As violence continued, the refugee situation would only grow; however, this was by no means a primary motivation for intervention. Indeed, if border security was the Sarkozy government’s sole reason, it could have instead focused on border security or even “cooperated with Qaddafi to crush the opposition.” posed “a true risk for Europe.” As violence continued the refugee situation would only grow; however, this was by no means a primary motivation for intervention. Indeed, if border security was the Sarkozy government’s sole reason, it could have instead focused on border security or even “cooperated with Qaddafi to crush the opposition.”

Finally, France believed that its prestige was at stake and could be improved. An advisor to Sarkozy told the Financial Times that Sarkozy was highly affected by reports that in Benghazi “French flags were everywhere...if he allowed a bloodbath there the blood would stain the French flag.”

Many saw French influence in the region weakened when it failed to intervene in Tunisia or Egypt on the side of the protestors. A New York Times editorial reasoned “that Sarkozy ‘saw Libya as a chance to recoup French prestige in North Africa, a region France has long considered important to its economy and security.’”

France also believed low-cost air intervention could be effective at aiding the opposition and hurting Qaddafi. France moved towards intervention when it gained support from Britain, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the United States, and the United Nations.

**United Kingdom on Libya**

The United Kingdom also played a leading role in the campaign for intervention and subsequent military actions. When arguing for intervention, the British government stepped up its rhetoric, with Prime Minister Cameron stating that there was demonstrable need, regional support, and a threat to British interests. Its motivations included Qaddafi’s violation of R2P and national security concerns, including threats posed by refugees and terrorism.
UK government officials repeatedly condemned Qaddafì’s use of force against civilians, including Libyan planes bombing their own people. However, the UK initially opposed EU sanctions against Qaddafì; only changing its stance when it became clear that Qaddafì was facing a significant challenge to this may be in part due to increased cooperation with Qaddafì since 1999, particularly on the part of British intelligence.

Once the UK government began actively speaking out against Qaddafì, it began to fear that Qaddafì would return to supporting terrorism if he succeeded in crushing the opposition. Similarly to France, Britain shared concerns over refugees and threats from Qaddafì’s Libya if he maintained power. Prime Minister Cameron stated on March 14, 2011 that “inaction would lead Libya to become a failed pariah state threatening to flood Britain with refugees and menace it with terror.” International support reassured Britain as it moved to address perceived threats to its security.

Although Libya was a relatively clear-cut case of the need for international intervention based on R2P, it occurred only due to a confluence of factors. France and the United Kingdom’s insistence on intervention, the United States’ endorsement, and Russia and China’s reluctant abstentions paved the way. The outcome in Libya may have saved lives, but also had implications for the future of R2P.

The operation in Libya could not have happened without the military support and participation of the United States or the political efforts by Britain and France. Although the pro-intervention parties claimed the goal was not to remove Qaddafì by force, an op-ed in the New York Times coauthored by President Obama, President Sarkozy, and Prime Minister Cameron asserted “it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafì in power.” The ambiguity of the phrase “all necessary measures” gave the coalition significant discretion in how to proceed.75For France and Britain, intervention was contingent upon overthrowing Qaddafì, and NATO’s subsequent actions indicate a determination to do so. NATO “was unequivocally committed to the rebel side, and to securing regime change, and acted accordingly militarily.” China’s and Russia’s perceptions were significantly influenced by the outcome of the Security Council’s decision on Libya, which helps account for their greater resistance to international action in Syria. This is somewhat understandable, given the possibility that “NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, including some in retreat and others in Qaddafì’s home town of Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians.” NATO’s implementation of Resolution1973may have threatened authorization of future
actions with respect to R2P in the UNSC, if China and Russia continue to see such resolutions as masks for pursuing regime change.

Libya from Arab Spring to failed state

Fighting erupted between rival militias in Tripoli, shattering a period of calm that lasted since March. The UN-backed government lost more than 50 fighters. Also, Egyptian air force planes continue to strike camps near Derna, in east Libya. The air strikes were a response to a deadly attack against Christians in Egypt that took place last Friday. The Egyptian president claims that the area hosts "terrorist camps".

There are three rival governments vying for control of Libya. There are two governments in Tripoli. One of them is the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), which has struggled to exert authority following the 2015 peace deal. This is mainly due to the refusal of authorities controlling eastern Libya to recognize the GNA as Libya's official government. Here is a breakdown of how Libya got to this point moving from a promising transitional government to a state of ongoing conflict.

The Uprising

Buoyed by the other revolts in neighboring Arab countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, Libya's popular uprising against the authoritarian rule of Muammar Gaddafi began in February 2011.

What started off as protests against Gaddafi's rule quickly descended into an armed conflict as security forces, loyal to Gaddafi, clashed with protesters, using warplanes to bomb them.

As protests entered their second week, almost 300 civilians were reported to have been killed.

The increasing number of civilian casualties led the United Nations to pass a resolution that designated Libya a no-fly zone. The resolution also called for the protection of civilians by any means necessary.

On March 31, NATO began carrying out air strikes as a result of the UN's proposal to protect civilians.

After the conclusion of the operation, a UN report found that 60 civilians were killed by NATO air strikes and 55 wounded. The report also states that
NATO did not carry thorough investigations regarding air raids that killed civilians. (21)

Libya, a country of about 6.4 million people, is mainly made up of Arab and Berber ethnicities. There are also nomadic tribes to the south, such as the Tuareg and Tebu tribes.

The country was ruled by Gaddafi for 42 years, making him the longest-reigning leader in the Arab world. He came to power in 1969 after a bloodless coup against Libya's King Idris I. And Libya's economy was heavily dependent on its crude oil industry. Before the popular uprising, the country produced around 1.6 million barrels a day. After the popular uprising, oil production plummeted to zero, but rose up again after the first elections. However, when the conflict flared up again in 2014, oil production fell, especially after rival militias started fighting over key oil facilities. As of early 2017, Libya produces around 700,000 barrels a day, according to the National Oil Corp; the country's GDP was heavily reliant on Libya's oil industry, so it drastically fell after the uprising.

Eight months after the uprising, the internationally recognized National Transition Council of Libya, largely comprising loosely organized local armed groups that sprang up in towns such as Benghazi and Misrata as a governing authority for the uprising, announced the "liberation" of Libya.

However, Libyans were soon frustrated with the interim government's failure to act. And the NTC had promised to fulfill a long list of needs, including a functioning justice system, a reconciliation process for officials who served the old administration, the disarming of militia, building functional national security forces, rebuilding destroyed areas and delivering basic services such as healthcare.

A great component of their failure was the stagnation of Libya's economy following the removal of Gaddafi. International advisers and foreign investors were reluctant to return to an environment where the government would not sign long-term agreements and could not guarantee security.

By July 2012, 2.7 million people registered to vote in Libya's first free election. The General National Congress (GNC) replaced the NTC after the elections.

Benghazi US Consulate Attack

In September 2012, a heavily armed group stormed the US Special Mission in Benghazi, and killed US Ambassador J Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.

Following the attack, the US and Britain withdrew some diplomatic staff from Libya, amid security concerns over a flare-up in political unrest.

Elections of 2014

Frustration against the GNC was exacerbated by its refusal to step down after the mandate for their rule expired. Thousands of Libyans protested in Tripoli and Benghazi, demanding the interim government step down as promised.

GNC members had extended the mandate to provide a special assembly with time to write a new constitution, which they claimed was imperative to a stable Libya.

Libya's second elections since the popular uprising were marred by violence. The voter turnout was low. Instead of voting for parties, Libyans voted for members of parliament in an attempt to ease tensions.

The GNC handed power over to the newly elected House of Representatives (HoR), while a battle raged in Tripoli's airport. "Libya could have stabilised after the popular uprising if the government didn't split into rivalling factions," said Nizar Krikshi, a Libyan political analyst.

"With [General Khalifa] Haftar's operation dignity, it became obvious that armed forces would be used to resolve the rivalry between the different political parties," Krikshi told Al Jazeera.

Unifying Libya's two governments

A UN peace deal, the Skhirat agreement, was signed in December 2015 and attempted to broker peace in the country by proposing a unified government.

The deal put together a six-point plan to end the conflict. It proposed a one-year transitional period during which they could decide on issues such as disarmament, control of the country's airports and the writing of a constitution.

At the time it was signed, a presidential council was expected to lead during the transitional period. The planned government was made up of a nine-member presidential council called the General National Accord (GNA), the elected HoR, and a State Council to serve as consultative chamber.

It fell on the presidential council to name a new government within a month, which a UN Security Council resolution promised to endorse.
A unified government was also seen as a way to end the rising threat of Islamic State group ISIL, also known as ISIS, in Libya. Western officials stated that the priority following the political agreement was to rebuild a national army to fight ISIL.

Current situation from 2016

By 2016, a revised national unity government was installed. The 2015 negotiations suffered delays owing to opposing factions, who still refuse to sign on the proposed government. The council that reached the agreement is made up of nine members from Libya's rival factions and headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister-designate.

After the political reshuffling, Libya's current key players include the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Sarraj and based in Tripoli. The GNA includes the presidential council and since March 2016 has controlled ministries and government facilities in the capital.

The State Council, the advisory body of the GNA, is led by Abdulrahman Sewehli. Under the 2015 peace deal, some decisions are supposed to be agreed upon by both council, which is supposed to serve as the unity government's legislative body.
The conclusion:

First: The research findings:

1- Article 36 of the Charter provides that, at any stage of a dispute of the kind described in Article 33, the Security Council can recommend to the parties appropriate procedures or methods of settlement of their dispute, which may include mediation.

2- There are two main impacts that can be discerned due the international intervention in Libya. First, the debates on Libya led to an explosion of discussions on R2P and increased international engagement with the emerging norm. Second, the controversies led to a shift in the international normative debates on protection by creating a coalition between those human security advocates who opposed stretching the mandate of Resolution 1973, and those countries with non-aligned or postcolonial perspectives that opposed regime change out of principle. This new coalition facilitated the start of an increased discussion about Security Council accountability and the criteria for humanitarian interventions.

3- The U.N.’s response to the conflict in Libya demonstrates that the Security Council can act swiftly and decisively where action is needed, and that governments can muster the political will and military strength to fulfill their responsibilities, including the protection of civilians. I recall that in 1999, NATO took action to halt “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, without seeking Security Council endorsement because it was assumed that any authorizing resolution would be vetoed.

4- The Arab League played a key role in legitimizing the intervention in Libya, and as a consequence the League increased its status and role as a legitimizer of conflict and popular demands for democratic freedoms. This was the first time the Arab League had supported military action against one of its own member states on account of its internal affairs. In many ways the Libya conflict transformed the Arab League into a more respectable and significant actor in the region.

Second: The recommendations:

1- Many reforms must be executed at the Security Council including the voting system and its membership.

2- The organization of the Islamic o-operation must be involve in many regional conflicts including the Syrian & the Libyan that its role is supposed to most
more of these conflicts as a great organization its membership includes a wide spots of the Islamic states in many parts of the world.

3- The regional organization at the Middle East and Africa must be activated to have more involvement in the regional and internal conflict what less the international interventions due this regard.

4- Make more research about the internal and regional conflicts in Africa and the Middle East and the way of disputing it.

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